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Please prepare response for DCI's signature.

10 November 82

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BARRY GOLDWATER

82-12977

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 2, 1982

The Honorable William Casey Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

Reading several articles lately, particularly one appearing in the Washington Times of October the 28th by Albert Weeks covering Afghanistan, has reminded me time and again of a day-long conversation I had with the Shah of Iran together with his Chiefs of Staff on the subject of Afghanistan. Particularly, the dangers it presented to the freedoms of the world and what the Shah's plans were to prevent the Russians from ever moving across that country or Pakistan or both to establish a harbor facility on the Indian Ocean. Those days spent in Iran and other days spent with people living in that part of the world, convinced me then, and I'm still convinced, that the Soviets had far more to do with the fall of the Shah than anyone has ever admitted or probably even known. I feel certain that the CIA has made extensive studies into this possibility, and I think it would be proper for your organization to brief the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on any background you have relative to Soviet moves in Iran, what is going on there now, and what you see for the future.

I would appreciate it if such a meeting could be arranged.

With lost wishes,

Barry Goldwater

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